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Darwin’s claim about natural selection is reconstructed as an empirical claim about 
the causal relevance of the match between the individual and its environment for the 
condition of the individual, and the consequence of this condition for leaving 
progeny. It is shown that many fitness proxies are mediating between these two 
steps. They are indicators of the match and predictors of reproductive success at 
once. Modern concepts of fitness, in contrast, are focusing exclusively on the latter. 
Assuming that Darwin wanted to explain selection in terms of a modern concept of 
fitness thus confounds his argument. Taking the janiform character of fitness proxies 
serious, in contrast, does not only allow for integrating Darwin’s argument into 
current evolutionary biology, but also helps reframing and alleviating the dispute 
between the Modern Synthesis and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. 
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1.	Introduction	
Darwin’s insight into the mechanism of evolutionary change by natural selection is 
often reduced to Spencer’s phrase of the survival of the fittest. Taking fitness as the 
number of surviving offspring, this phrase becomes a truism. We face the situation 
that Darwin’s insight either lacks explanatory power, or that his concept of fitness is 




of the Origin of Species (Darwin 1859) and thus from the argument as he gave it 
before Spencer’s phrase was included. It turns out that his claim differs drastically 
from the reading of Spencer’s phrase as it became usual within the framework of the 
Modern Synthesis (MS). My reconstruction in section 2 shows that the claim has 
strong empirical content and that, while a notion close to fitness in the sense of 
population genetics can in fact be found in Darwin, this is not even closely related to 
what he means when using the term “the fittest”. The main issue is that Darwin 
proposed a two-step mechanism for natural selection that involves ecological 
interaction, the consequences of this interaction for the condition of the individual, 
and the consequence of this condition for leaving progeny. It is not merely a single 
step from fitness to reproduction. As to be expected from a ground-braking insight, 
his claim is not tautological but refutable and in need of strong empirical support. 
This might be one reason why the Origin is so rich in reported observations and 
discussed analogies.  
Taking Darwin’s empirical claim serious allows for a fresh look at the role of fitness 
proxies in evolutionary research, which follows in section 3. It is shown that fitness 
proxies of the most often used kind, like the individual growth rate, are, over and 
above being predictors of fitness, also measures of how well an individual matches 
its environment. They are janiform, looking at the same time at the physiological-
ecological match and at reproductive success.  
Part 4 shows how the dispute between the MS and the Extended Evolutionary 
Synthesis (EES) can be reconstructed as the attempt to convince the proponents of 
the respective other side that only one of the faces of fitness proxies is relevant. 




Darwin’s argument about the generation of biological species (Darwin 1859; 1876) is 
based on the idea of natural selection, which combines three ideas.1 The first is the 
                                                
1 I am concerned only with this claim about natural selection and not with the whole 
argument about speciation. Though the derivation of the claim is part of the overall 




general observation that individuals differ, and that this holds for all species. The 
second is the empirical finding that, in the wild, most individuals are dying at early 
developmental stages or at young age. The third is the theoretical result that in 
populations of biological individuals that produce more than one offspring during 
their lifetime, in the long run not all offspring can possibly survive. Let me first 
recapitulate this tripartite point of departure, which provides the basis of Darwin’s 
empirical claim about evolutionary change, in reversed order. 
The theoretical result at the basis of the argument is that unrestricted populations 
grow geometrically (i.e., exponentially), and that, if food supply grows only linearly, 
not all individuals can possibly survive. Darwin borrows this result from Malthus 
(1798, pp. 4, 6-7). In the third chapter of the Origin of Species, he transfers the 
“doctrine of Malthus” from human social systems to “the whole animal and 
vegetable kingdoms” and stresses that there can be neither an artificial increase of 
food nor “prudential restraint from marriage” in these kingdoms (Darwin 1859, p. 
47). The situation therefore is that not all animals can and will survive.  
This theoretical result is confirmed and specified by the empirical finding that, in the 
wild, most individuals die at early developmental stages or at young age. Darwin 
points out that many seeds and seedlings, eggs and young are “destroyed” (ibid., pp. 
47, 48 et pass.). Not only food shortage is the reason for these deaths, though he 
counts it as important at least in the context of climate and seasonal changes. 
Relevant is also that many young individuals serve other animals as prey (ibid., p. 
50).  
Consequently, Darwin considers it inevitable that, in each species, many individuals 
die before their time, in particular before they had a chance to propagate. But this 
does not say anything about which individuals among the young ones die and which 
ones survive. Survival could be a matter of chance, of being, e.g., first or last born, or 
of any other account. Darwin prepares his answer to this question (which he does not 
ask explicitly) by referring to the general observation that individuals differ, and that 
this holds for all species. Variation is so important for his argument that he 
commences his Origin with two chapters on differences between individuals. In the 
first chapter, he describes variability as a phenomenon that allows breeders to form 
varieties of a species by selecting individuals for breeding that have traits deviating 
                                                                                                                                     
purpose whether it is indeed only one or whether there are parallel arguments (Hodge 




in the desired direction from other individuals. In the second chapter, he states that 
variation also occurs in nature and is thus not an artifact of domestication. Darwin 
doesn’t have a satisfying explanation of variation itself, but tries to make its 
occurrence as plausible as he could by providing examples, both in the domesticated 
situation and in the wild. He discusses proposals made by other authors, namely that 
variation was induced by light, food excess, or other external factors. Darwin himself 
is cautious in ascribing these factors more that a minor influence. But he considers 
variation, whatever its origin might be, as a matter of fact, and most variation being 
heritable. (ibid., p. 10). 
The theoretical result about overproduction of offspring, confirmed by the empirical 
result that there is indeed overproduction of offspring that is regulated by the dead 
mainly of young individuals, leads in combination with the observation of heritable 
individual differences (however induced) to Darwin’s central claim that exactly those 
individual differences will make the difference in survival: “any variation, however 
slight and from whatever cause proceeding, if it be in any degree profitable to an 
individual of any species, in its infinitely complex relations to other organic beings 
and to external nature, will tend to the preservation of that individual, and will 
generally be inherited by its offspring. The offspring, also, will thus have a better 
chance of surviving” (ibid., p. 46). It follows the introduction of the term ‘Natural 
Selection’: “I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is 
preserved, by the term of Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man's 
power of selection” (ibid.). Darwin conceives this process as probabilistic: “[I]f 
variations useful to any organic being do occur, assuredly individuals thus 
characterised will have the best chance of being preserved [...] and [...] tend to 
produce offspring similarly characterised” (Darwin 1859 p. 92, italics added). But 
this is merely a probabilistic weakening of the connection between “profitability” of 
a certain variation and survival. Which individuals survive is not a matter of pure 
chance. 
The strength of this claim depends on how convincingly individual differences are 
linked to survival. Darwin’s conceives the link consisting in the match between the 
individual’s traits and its environment: Survival is supported by those variations of 
traits that are “profitable” for the individual “in its infinitely complex relations to 
other organic beings and to external nature”, i.e., by variations that allow the 
individual to cope better with its biotic and abiotic environment. In the definition, 
this is abridged to “being useful”. Reference to the biotic and abiotic environment 
and to the match of the (traits of the) individual to its environment shows that natural 




heritability of variation, which is at this point merely postulated but supported in 
later chapters with a plethora of empirical examples, and with the idea that the range 
of variation shifts so that also the limits of variability grow or shift with each new 
variant, that they depart further and further from the original type, as Wallace puts it 
in his version of a the selection theory (Wallace 1858, p. 54), it gains its evolutionary 
relevance. 
2.3	Fit(tedness)	
Darwin speaks about the profitability of certain variations for the individual’s coping 
with its environment, which I have called above the match of the individual and its 
environment. This, however, is not a term Darwin uses (except in the context of 
breeding). He speaks sometimes of the individual or its trait as being adapted, in 
particular when stabile traits of a species are at stake (Darwin 1859, pp. 2, 45, 57 et 
pass.). In more general cases and also with respect to new variations, he usually 
speaks of the fit between individual and environment. He also refers to an individual 
or a character as being fitted to or for the environment, or to certain ends: The flying 
lemur’s wings are fitted for gliding through the air (ibid., p. 130). Darwin admires 
“how infinitely complex and close-fitting [...] the mutual relations of all organic 
beings to each other and to their physical conditions of life” are (ibid., p. 59). The 
fitting-relations is graded, so, e.g., seeds are better or less well fitted for dispersal 
(ibid., p. 106). Better fit, Darwin claims, gives the individual that produces these 
seeds an advantage over the others (ibid., p. 106).  
Darwin uses the metaphor of being fitted already in his essays from 1842 and 1844, 
respectively, where he speaks about recent and fossil organisms as being “fitted to 
wholely different ends” (Darwin 1842/1844, p. 30) and, about Rhinoceroses in 
former times, that “some of these ancient animals were fitted to very different 
stations” (ibid., p. 37). He writes about species being fitted to diversified means of 
subsistence (ibid., p. 146), “best fitted to its new habits and station” (ibid., p. 156) 
and for being “fitted to widely different ends in the economy of nature” (ibid., p. 
160). He uses also negations and speaks of organisms being unfit for a new climate 
regime (ibid., p. 173) or being ill-fitted (Darwin 1859, p. 261). 
In order to disambiguate Darwin’s use of “being fitted”, I call the degree of being 
fitted to the environment (rather than to ends or to habits, that were to be evaluated 
with respect to the environment anyway) the fittedness of an individual. 
Fittedness has consequences. Darwin points out that an increase of fit increases the 




is what makes the difference with respect to survival. The better fitting individual 
(or, in analogy: species) has greater chances to leave offspring than the less well 
fitted individual, which runs greater risk to die too early in life to leave progeny. 
Presupposing heritability of variation and new variation occurring in the offspring, 
natural selection leads to a gradual improvement of fittedness in a given 
environment, and to regaining fittedness after a change of the environment. So 
fittedness is on what natural selection acts and thus has an important explanatory 
role: differences in fittedness explain differences (of the chance to) leaving offspring.  
The notion that fittedness is the criterion for survival and the basis for gradual 
changes is a strong empirical claim. Darwin presents throughout the book a lot of 
observational material to support this claim. From his examples we can get an idea 
how fittedness could be measured. Darwin obviously does not hesitate to ascribe 
biological functions or even purposes to traits, like flying to the bat, gliding to the 
flying lemur etc., and also to ascribe a lack of function, i.e., with respect to upper 
limb bones of whales. But this can be translated into talk about physiological 
capabilities. So the adequacy of the physiological capabilities to cope with the 
environment, e.g., to locomote and to get food, is the criterion for fittedness. An 
organism with wings is well fitted to an environment where the prey can best be 
reached via the air, one with flippers would have lower fittedness in such an 
environment. So we have a two-step mechanism that leads from variation to the 
number of progeny, and consequently a two-step explanation. Step one: Variation 
modifies the fittedness or an organism. Step two: the individual with higher 
fittedness will leave more offspring. Step one refers to physiological and ecological 
changes. Step two yields the evolutionary result of natural selection: individuals with 
a better ecological match, with higher fittedness, leave, on average, more offspring.  
It is unlikely, though not impossible, that the first step of this explanation is 
completely and in all cases wrong, which would mean that no variation would 
influence how smoothly an individual can cope with its environment. The second 
step, however, could easily turn out to be empirically wrong, either generally or for 
some species, and in the latter case either in all settings or only in some particular 
situations. It might well be that in some species individuals that fit physiologically 
almost perfect into their environment have less offspring than individuals with lower 
fittedness. One can think of manifold reasons. They might be too lazy or too busy to 
build nests, unattractive for possible mates, themselves too picky in choosing mates, 
etc. Or they might be sterile, like mules. It is also not very likely that fittedness, 
which depends on many parameters of which many will be quite unstable, is a 
parameter that could be determined with such high precision that one could indeed 




presents a highly plausible explanatory scheme and shows that it can be applied 
fruitfully in many cases.  
2.4	Fitness:	no	tautology,	ever	
The mentioned numerical fuzziness of fittedness might have been one reason why 
the Modern Synthesis (cf. Huxley 1942) read Darwin’s talk about fit in a completely 
different way than presented above and introduced the concept of fitness as the 
number of surviving offspring, grandoffspring, or contribution to the gene pool 
(which was, of course, for Darwin no accessible option) (cf. Ariew and Lewontin 
2004), or, as it was proposed later on, to define fitness as the propensity (Mills and 
Beatty 1979; Richardson and Burian 1992; Bouchard and Rosenberg 2004). This 
inverts the direction of explanation: Fitness can in principle be measured and its 
value allows to infer how well the organism could cope with its environment, how 
well it is adapted. Within population genetics, fitness is indeed all one needs and 
fittedness would not contribute to this approach. It would not be independently 
accessible with its means either. 
Before further contrasting the concept of fittedness with that of fitness, let me have 
another look at Darwin, in particular at where the point of reference for the 
population genetical concept of fitness can be found. This is at the same time the 
reference for the philosophical debate about this concept. This point of reference is 
related only loosely to Darwin’s talk about fit, unfit and “fitted” individuals as 
reconstructed above. Instead, the debate is hooked to the so-called fitness principle, 
the phrase claiming the Survival of the Fittest, that Darwin added in the 5th edition of 
the Origin and that we find in the most popular 6th edition. He took it up from 
Herbert Spencer (Spencer 1864) and inserted it right behind the definition of the 
concept of natural selection: “But the expression often used by Mr Herbert Spencer 
of the Survival of the Fittest is more accurate, and is sometimes equally convenient” 
(Darwin 1872, p. 51).  
Spencer’s phrase gave rise to several severe misunderstandings and was reinterpreted 
again and again within varying contexts (cf. Krohs 2006). Because of its ambiguity, 
Thomas Henry Huxley considered it an unlucky substitution for “natural selection” 
(Huxley 1890). Nevertheless, it became the catchword of Darwin’s theory, and it – 
rather than Darwin’s extensive use of “fit” and “being fitted” – gave later on rise to 
the concept of fitness, which is so important in population genetics.  
With a (merely stylistical) grain of salt, and detaching it from Darwin’s use of “fit” 




definition of the concept of fitness: fitness is survival, to be understood from the 
context as long-term survival of the lineage (this being the reading of the Modern 
Synthesis, not of Darwin himself). And fitness is graded: if a certain individual can 
be said to the “the fittest”, than obviously others have lower fitness. It is also clear 
that the phrase is not to be read that only one, “the fittest” individual survives, so 
grades of fitness map on grades of survival of lineages.  
Now came the philosophers, in times when only very few philosophers of biology 
understood biology (cf. Grene and Depew 2004), and noticed in person Karl Popper 
that, since fitness is the number of offspring, the fitness principle is (almost) a 
tautology. It merely states that the survivor survives (Popper 1974). Though often 
interpreted as severe criticism, Poppers position was just that evolutionary theory, 
being based on a tautology, is irrefutable – its core was not empirically refutable, so 
he took it to be a metaphysical research program (non-pejoratively used). After 
having been convinced that even evolutionary biology is empirical science, his way 
to deal with the principle was to grant it empirical content rather than to see it as a 
definition within the framework of the Modern Synthesis. His way out was to take 
fitness not as the actual number of offspring, but as the propensity, or objective 
probability, or stochastic disposition, to leave a certain number of offspring (Popper 
1978). Popper is right, of course, that this grants empirical content to the fitness 
principle. There can and will be differences between objective probabilities and their 
actualizations – otherwise we needed no concept of probability (or propensity). But 
this move reduces the empirical content of evolutionary to a difference between 
probable and actual number of offspring. This can hardly be the correct 
understanding of evolutionary and I do not consider this a valid solution of the 
tautology problem, as do not others.  
The debate about fitness being actual number of offspring (or contribution to gene 
pool etc.) or the corresponding propensity is still going on (e.g., Pence and Ramsey 
2013; Drouet and Merlin 2015). With respect to the Origin, none of the two positions 
is correct for Darwin, but at the same time none contradicts what he says about fit. 
First of all: he nowhere uses the term “fitness”, in his Origin. Even “fittest” he uses 
exclusively as a part of Spencer’s phrase, never independently. It does not occur in 
the first edition. In the sixth edition it occurs 15 times, two times thereof in chapter 
headings, and, as said, in all cases as component of the ever identical phrase. This 
means that no passage in the Origin allows reading fitness, or even the abundantly 
used “fit”, being a label for leaving offspring (1st and 6th edition were checked). This 
he calls descriptively “to yield offspring”, “success in leaving progeny”, “leaving” or 




more specific “producing seeds” (Darwin 1859, p. 106) etc. 
Let’s take stock. (1) In Darwin, we find a concept of fit or of being fitted to the 
environment, to habits, or to ends. It captures the match between an individual’s 
physiology and its environment. To disambiguate it from denoting different relations, 
I use “fittedness” for the match of the individual to its environment. This is an 
ecological, better to say, a physio-ecological concept. While Sober has called it 
fitness as an ecological descriptor (Sober 2001), I see no reason to count it as a 
concept of fitness at all. (2) In population genetics, we find the concept of fitness, or 
several related concepts of fitness, as the number of offspring or as the contribution 
to a gene pool, which helps explaining and predicting changes in the gene pool. 
Sober calls this fitness as a mathematical predictor (Sober 2001). Darwin, who has 
no need for such a numerical concept (and could not have any idea of population 
genetics), just describes the phenomenon as producing more or less offspring. The 
explanatory goals of Darwin and of population genetics are different. Darwin wanted 
to present an explanation how variation leads to differential reproduction, and his 
explanation is an ecological one. Population genetics takes it for granted that 
selection acts on variation, and sees no need in any independent assessment of how a 
phenotype matches its environment. This fittedness can, within a framework of 
strong adaptationsim (cf. Godfrey-Smith 2001), be directly inferred from the fitness 
value, without any considerations about how particular physiological traits match the 
environment. This is true as long as the Darwinian mechanism is not questioned. (3) 
Philosophy of biology has brought up the concept of fitness as propensity. The aspect 
of propensity occurs in Darwin as chance to survive and to propagate. Fitness in this 
reading is not identical to, but a consequence of fittedness. According to Darwin, the 
fit(tedness) predicts the chance to have offspring. The better the fit, the higher the 
chance. Fitness as propensity is a theoretical term that captures this chance. (4) The 
relevant empirical claim, however, is not that this propensity will on average be more 
or less be realized, but that fittedness gives rise to such propensity. 
3.	Fitness	proxies		
3.1	Establishing	fitness	proxies	
Given that fitness in the sense of actual contribution to the gene pool is an important 
parameter in evolution research, and that fitness is often estimated by using fitness 
proxies, I want to show how the distinctions made above apply to present-day 
research, and how Darwin’s own approach helps understanding the role of fitness 




since determining fitness is often desired, but unfeasible. When generation time is 
short with respect to the observation period, fitness can in principle be measured 
directly or at least estimated on the basis of data directly related to reproductive 
success. Just to mention two examples, the contribution of an organism to the gene 
pool can be reconstructed by counting offspring through many filial generations, or 
the abundance of a genetic marker can be measured. In organisms with long 
generation time and long reproductive phases, things become more complicated. 
Measuring or estimating fitness directly is prohibited by the mismatch of the 
experimental and the reproductive timescale. Researchers then resort to fitness 
proxies – parameters that are somehow linked to fitness and allow estimating fitness 
even when it is not feasible to measure. Depending on the organism, candidates for 
fitness proxies could be, e.g., individual growth rate or annual reproductive success 
(Krüger et al. 2021).  
The connection between annual reproductive success and fitness seems to be fairly 
direct, though not free of disturbance. The first might be a good estimate, but is by no 
means a real measure of the latter. Growth rate, however, need not be thus clearly 
linked to fitness. It is easy to imagine that faster growing organisms couls leave even 
less offspring than slower growing ones, which means that the relation between the 
two parameters needs first to be established empirically for a species before growth 
rate can be taken being a proxy of fitness. In some cases it turned out to be quite 
good a proxy (Higginson 2020). In others, a measure of camouflage (Schielzeth, 
preprint) or of body condition (Milenkaya et al. 2015) were found to make up good 
fitness proxies.  
The appropriateness of a proxy needs to be established by demonstrating that the 
value of the proxy co-varies with the fitness value. For understanding the roles of 
fitness proxies, it is helpful to look into the reasons for this. Systematic co-variation 
may in principle have different reasons. Fitness proxy and fitness could be causally 
or constitutively linked. In the case of a causal link, the proxy could be among the 
direct or indirect causes of fitness, it could be a direct or indirect effect of fitness, or 
both could be among the effects of a common cause. In the constitutive case, one 
could be among the constituents of the other: the proxy could be part of the basis of 
the emerging phenomenon called fitness, or vice versa, or both could emerge from a 
shared basic system.  
With some of the proxies mentioned, it is quite clear that fitness depends in these 
cases causally on the proxy: the contribution to the future gene pool depends on the 
success of camouflage or on the body condition, not the other way around. With 




correlation brought about by a complex common cause. The number of surviving 
offspring depends on food intake, as does the individual growth rate. Effective 
foraging behavior, if it is inheritable genetically or culturally, may lead to a high 
individual growth rate and to survival of the offspring that also shows this behavior. 
At least, total offspring number at the end of life will neither cause nor constitute 
growth rate in early life.  
These cases have in common that fitness either depends on the proxy, or on a cause 
of the proxy. There are other cases where an indirect measure of fitness depends on 
fitness itself: if the contribution to the gene pool is measured by the abundance of a 
unique trait, the measured parameter depends on fitness of the predecessors rather 
than the other way around. Usually, the measured parameter would not be called a 
proxy in this case, but the situation needs to be considered as one of the options 
nevertheless.  
3.2	The	two	faces	of	fitness	proxies	
Many fitness proxies are physiological parameters that also depend on environmental 
conditions, as is obvious in the cases of individual growth rate and of camouflage. 
These proxies do not only face to fitness as a downstream effect, but are also 
indicating the physiological condition and might even be a measure of how well the 
individual copes with its environment – the fittedness of the organism. These 
janiform fitness proxies face in both directions, to fitness and to fittedness. 
Concentrating on the case that the proxy is a cause of fitness or an indicator of such a 
cause, it is easy to see why it can be a good proxy and thus faces fitness: as long as 
no other causal contributions are systematically interfering, the proxy will map on 
fitness. Interference might easily occur, so not any causally relevant parameter is a 
good candidate for fitness. Breathing, for example, is a causal precondition for any 
offspring production in terrestrial animals. But many other factors will me more 
relevant for the reproduction rate and for survival of the offspring than breath rate, so 
that this parameter would hardly be a valid proxy of fitness. In the end, usefulness of 
a parameter as proxy needs to be established empirically in each case. This means 
that many proxies can assume their role because fitness depends on the parameter 
chosen as its proxy. The proxy is part of the causal mechanism that brings the 
contribution to the gene pool about. Due to this involvement, the proxy can be used 
as a predictor of fitness. This is one role of many fitness proxies. 
But, as suggested above, there is a second role since many fitness proxies at the same 
time indicate fittedness. Growth rate, production of offspring and similar parameters 




focus on the environment is too narrow a perspective. What counts as food, or as 
shelter, depends on the organism. How much of the food supply it can use depends 
on its traits and on their individual characteristic. An individual bird that has a 
stronger beak than its conspecifics will be able to feed on certain seeds better than 
the others. An eagle with weaker eyesight will gain less weight, or will gain it more 
slowly, than one with sharp sight. So it is not the environment, but the ease of 
interaction of the individual with the environment that causes quicker growth. 
Growth rate therefore is an indicator of how well the individual copes with the 
environment. In other words: it is a direct or indirect causal effect of the match of the 
individual with its environment. In this perspective, the fitness proxy measures the 
match between organism and environment, i.e., the fittedness of the organism. This is 
the other role of many fitness proxies. 
Adaptationists may interpret the observation that the fitness proxy has this double 
role in the following way (several did so in personal discussions): Of course the 
fitness proxy measures match, but only because match is to be judged in terms of 
fitness anyway. There is, according to adaptationism, no fitness-independent measure 
of match since survival is the one and only currency in the game. But this argument 
mistakes the status of the proxy with respect to fitness.  
As seen above, it is not only a predictor of fitness, but also an indicator of fittedness. 
Thanks to facing also to fittedness, the proxy assesses first of all how well the 
individual copes with its environment. When Darwin considers a strong beak 
matching with hard seeds, this holds even when the individual does not propagate. 
Match can be observed and investigated empirically. It neither needs to be, nor could 
possibly be derived from successful propagation. Biology is used to analyze even 
highly complex interactions, within the cell, within an organ, within an organism, 
and between organism and environment. That two macromolecules, say an enzyme 
and a nucleic acid, bind to each other and that one, e.g., catalyzes a reaction of the 
other with another molecule can be observed, though indirectly, by biochemical 
methods. We need not first look whether the reaction has a fitness effect, though we 
will often assume this. If a reaction turns out not increasing fitness, this will not 
corroborate the observation concerning match. The same with organism and 
environment: we have criteria of interaction to judge match. Sometimes integrity of 
the organism may indeed play a role: snails match with feeding on toadstools, 
mammals do not. This is a physiological criterion, a matter whether the organism 
keeps its functional integrity, not an evolutionary or population-genetical question. 
Only secondarily comes selection: the better matching organisms leave more 
surviving offspring – and this holds only statistically. If a systematic relation 




fitness as a propensity. The parameter that serves as a But Darwin’ empirical claim 
seems to be confirmed fitness proxy thus measures some aspect of the fittedness of 
an organism and serves at the same time as a predictor of fitness. I take this being the 
reason why Sober can say that fitness as a propensity is a physiological descriptor 
(Sober 2001). However, not fitness itself is the descriptor, but the proxy, which 
serves at the same time, empirically confirmed rather than by definition, as an 
indicator of fitness as propensity. Not fitness, as Sober says, but fitness proxies have 
two faces. Granting Darwin’s claim empirical content, this content is reflected 
exactly in their janiform character. 
4.	Fitness	proxies	and	the	debate	about	modern	and	
extended	synthesis	
The insight in the two faces of fitness proxies helps better understanding the 
differences between the Modern Synthesis (MS) and the Extended Evolutionary 
Synthesis (EES), and it helps overcoming those differences. In this last section I first 
sketch how the differences between both approaches are presented by the respective 
proponents, and then discuss how acknowledging the janiform character of fitness 
proxies can help understanding better the difference and conciliating the positions. 
4.1	Explanation	in	MS	and	in	EES	
Proponents of EES claim central roles of extra-genetic inheritance for evolutionary 
processes. They consider genetic adaptation (Waddington 1942) being important in 
fixing phenotypic changes genetically in the generations after they occurred by 
organism-environment-interactions. Not mutations, but phenotypic variation 
resulting from environmental conditions comes first. Therefore they regard plastic 
changes as important drivers of evolution. In general, they recognize “processes by 
which organisms grow and develop [...] as causes of evolution” (Laland et al. 2014).  
Proponents of MS, in contrast, believe that their classical approach, in which 
phenotypic variation is largely driven by genetic variation, accounts adequately for 
all these points: they accept genetic adaptation but see a lack of empirical examples 
beyond processes generated experimentally. They stress that phenotypic plasticity, 
niche construction, inclusive inheritance and developmental bias, which were 
claimed by proponents of EES being not adequately accounted for in MS, “are 
already well integrated into evolutionary biology, where they have long provided 
useful insights.” However, they see the processes as “‘add- ons’ to the basic 




recombination and gene flow. None of these additions is essential for evolution, but 
they can alter the process under certain circumstances” (Wray, Hoekstra et al. 2014).  
From an external perspective, the differences stated so far seem to be merely about 
the abundance and importance of certain mechanism for evolution. There is genetic 
adaptation, there is phenotypic plasticity, but how important is it? There is niche 
construction, but is the extra-genetic inheritance it allows for strong enough to gain 
evolutionary relevance over and above its genetic basis? There are mutations and 
they are important for evolutionary processes, but aren’t other processes driving 
evolution as well? Compared to the vigorousness of the debate, these differences 
appear almost marginal. At least they are in the end quantitative disagreements, 
which might better be solved by empirical research than by conceptual rencounters. 
But things are not that easy. Firstly, quantitative differences might result in 
qualitative ones so that theories starting from MS and EES assumptions, respectively, 
could still be fundamentally different. Secondly and much more important, the 
picture is not yet complete. What I left out so far is what both sides are considering 
as an evolutionary explanation.  
The classical view of MS regards evolution as the change of gene frequencies. 
Accordingly, it is claimed that “what matters ultimately is not the extent of trait 
variation, nor even its precise mechanistic causes. What matters is the heritable 
differences in traits, especially those that bestow some selective advantage” (Wray, 
Hoekstra et al. 2014). So these proponents of MS explicitly abstain from any 
mechanistic explanation of evolutionary events. While not denying that there might 
be a causal story to be told about some evolutionary processes, like in genetic 
adaptation, this is classified as irrelevant. Important are only heritable differences in 
traits and not how they come about. This is not as narrow-minded as it might look. If 
evolution is the change of gene frequencies, this change seems to be fully explained 
by assigning a fitness value to each allele and calculate the outcome, or vice versa. 
From statistical mechanics it can be seen that such a stance is a fully: In order to 
describe what is going on in a volume of freely moving particles, you need to know 
the number, collision diameter, and mean energy of the particles, but not the details 
of how exactly a collision takes place in terms of causal or better to say quantum 
mechanical interactions. 
EES, on the other hand, is interested exactly in these causal processes that are going 
on in the background of evolution on the population level. Here, “the processes by 
which organisms grow and develop are recognized as causes of evolution.” (Laland 




phenomena [i.e., development, environmental plasticity and extra-genetic 
inheritance] are just outcomes of evolution. For the EES, they are also causes” 
(ibid.). Even if it might be too restricted a view about MS that it takes these 
phenomena just as outcomes, it is clear that such causal processes play no 
explanatory role in MS because they are considered being just a source of variation. 
They enable evolutionary processes, but do not influence the direction of evolution. 
The latter is left to the selective regime. EES, in contrast, aims at mechanistic 
explanations of how evolutionary event are brought about.  
AT stake in the dispute, however, is not in which field the approaches are interested, 
but what is disputed. MS does not deny that there are causal processes that bring part 
of the variation about, but merely that these processes are relevant for explaining 
evolution. EES does not deny that gene frequencies alter and that random variation 
may lead to evolutionary change, but only that all variation is random – which does 
not at all mean that it is directed, but only that it can be biased by causal processes, 
which therefore need to be acknowledged in explaining evolution. Part of these 
differences reduces to an empirical question: is there a significant number of cases 
where causal accounts of the generation of variants yield better explanations than 
explanations that rely fully on random variation. Linked to this quantitative question 
is the differences about what should count as an evolutionary explanation. Only on 
this level, the relevance of explanations on the level of causal processes affecting the 
phenotype, disputed by proponents of MS, and the preeminence of random genetic 
variation as disputed by adherents of EES, appear to be irreconcilable. 
4.2	Fitness	proxies	as	mediators	between	the	two	syntheses	–	a	proxy	of	a	
conclusion	
A look at the janiform character and double role of fitness proxies is helpful to better 
understand and perhaps even resolve the dispute. As we have seen, a proxy can be 
applied as predicting fitness, or as measuring the fittedness of an organism to its 
environment. Analogously, each trait can just be accepted as being there, showing a 
certain range of variation so that each variant has its specific fitness value, or else be 
regarded as the outcome of causal interactions between the individual and its 
environment. If we follow Darwin and consider the fittedness of an organism as 
explaining its survival and reproductive success, it seems natural counting causal 
processes that alter fittedness as influencing evolution, over and above simply 
changing the selective regime – on the condition that this variation is heritable, be it 
(epi)genetically or simply by inheriting the environmental conditions that bring the 
variant about, and later genetic adaptation. The aspect EES adds to the classical 




the interaction between environment and individual. This includes change of the 
environment by niche construction, but also change of the organism by 
environmental influences, that may include heterochronic effects as well as 
phenotypic plasticity. In Darwin’s case of the earthworm (Darwin 1881) that 
exemplifies what we now call niche construction (Odling Smee et al. 2003; Sultan 
2015), both perspectives are already present. MS was extremely successful in 
focusing on evolution understood as the alteration of gene pools, and omitted the 
aspect of causal individual mechanisms because of its disregard of any physiological 
account of fittedness. If fittedness is re-interpreted as reproductive success, as 
methodological adaptationism tends to do, one simply needs not look at the causal 
interactions that constitute fittedness, but concentrates exclusively on the causality of 
selection. MS shifted fittedness exclusively to ecology, while evolutionary biology 
could view everything through the pinhole of fitness. The Darwinian unity of 
ecology and evolution was divorced. The fittedness-side is now put forward as the 
EES alternative to MS. But the use of fitness proxies shows how both sides still 
belong together, inevitably. Any fitness proxy that is not merely a consequence of 
fitness, but a predictor, is at the same time measuring fittedness. MS looks 
exclusively for explanations on the one side, EES stresses the unequaled importance 
of explanations on the other. Both work janiform fitness proxies. Time to 
acknowledge that explanations need to go from one side to the other rather than only 
starting at the middle line. 
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